

Justice, joy and educational delights

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Before I say anything else I want to thank you all for coming to this lecture. And I also want to thank the Moray House School of Education and Edinburgh University, in general, for giving me such a happy intellectual home for the last two and a half years. And I also want to say how happy I am with my title. This chair is the Professor of Classroom Learning. And what a wonderful title that is. It seems to me that classroom learning is at the heart of what formal education is. Though, when I say ‘formal education’, I want to make it clear that I include in ‘the classroom’, my office, my computer, the car, trains, informal meeting spaces (coffee shops, pubs, railway stations) and anywhere else that learning takes place as part of formal education.

Since this is a professorial inaugural lecture, I want to use it to profess the point and practice of education. That is (to use dictionary definitions) I want to affirm it and to claim knowledge of it. For much of my professional life I have been clear that formal education and social justice are bound up with each other. I shall begin with some observations about social justice and education, and go on to use them to say something about the point of formal education, and what implications that has for our practice as teachers and teacher educators.

In the lecture I begin by (1) noting the reasons that people find value in education. I then go on (2) to remind ourselves of the usual account of social justice in education, and also to remind ourselves of some dismal findings about it. I continue (3) by considering just what it is that is dismal about these findings. This leads me (4) to go beyond the usual story of education and social justice and begin to explore what has been left out of the usual story. (5) In the second part of the lecture I suggest that what has been left out is partly to be found in the concept of joy in relation to justice. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s phrase, I propose that we ‘think what we are doing’, and do so by attending to pedagogical delights. (6) I focus on my own pedagogical delights, in order to tease out some features of delight in education, and to suggest (7) that attending to such features tells us something important about education, and (8) that the loss of that is itself an injustice. That is, that it is important to attend to justice *in* education as well as *from* education. Finally, (9) I pose some questions about the implications for our own practice here, in Moray House School of Education, as teacher educators.

(1) Reasons that people find value in education

It is often noted that there are two reasons that people find value in education. Firstly, It has an obvious use value in that it can give people an entry into some desired occupation. This is nothing new. To give just one example, literacy has long been used – and still is – as a path to money, power and status. We could go back 3000 years to ancient Egypt where very few people were able to read and write. Those who could were the officials with status. A major use of literacy was for accounting, and those who could do this were able to command bankers’ levels of remuneration (Baines, 1983). But secondly, there is another kind of value altogether. Education can

be valued in itself. These two possibilities are sometimes referred to as vocational and liberal education. Or perhaps, to use the influential German tradition we might think of the two possibilities as, to use the German, *Bildung* and instrumental education. These two are often thought of as oppositional, but I think that most educational activity includes some of both. It is also possible to move from one to the other. A person may approach education for vocational or instrumental reasons and then find that it has become something personally valuable. This might be compared with another familiar human experience. A person entering a relationship for sexual or instrumental reasons can find they have unexpectedly fallen in love.

(2) Social justice: the usual account and some dismal findings

I'll begin with the usual story of social justice. It is a story that I accept and have had a hand in telling. Social justice is usually felt as an issue when there is a perceived injustice. So the usual story of social justice is usually told as a dismal story of injustice.

I would like you to consider the following four scenes from formal education in relation to social justice. The first is taken from the google images website, as is the



last. The first picture shows a class in rural India. The second is my own photo of a primary school in the centre of Nottingham in the mid 1990s. The third is a class photograph taken in the 1930s in Ruddington village school, near Nottingham. The fourth is easily recognizable in Edinburgh. It is a landmark here: Fettes College. There are some obvious social justice themes to be found in these pictures. They include: social class, world inequalities, inner cities, race, gender and historical legacies. I doubt that the children and grandchildren of those boys on the left are currently being educated in a school like that one on the right. Other themes might come from the respect that might be accorded to children dressed like the Ruddington boys compared to their peers in places like Fettes. Or from the chances of the boys or girls in the first two pictures of getting their points of view heard in the wider world's

public spaces. In mentioning these themes I am referring to current understanding of social justice in education; it is an understanding which I share.

Social justice as fair distribution

I mentioned social class, race, gender and also world inequalities. All of these (as well as disability, religion, ethnicity, sexuality and rural/city differences) are issues of fair distribution. John Rawls is a philosopher who has articulated this position very well and very influentially. He argues that:

Social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1972: 14-15)

Much more could be said about this, and about Rawls's particular argument, but my purpose here is only to give a reminder of the main contours of the argument.

As I said earlier, concern for social justice means having a concern for social injustice: in what follows is a reminder of not-so-fair distribution in terms of just two axes of difference: race and class. I have chosen to use these two axes here, but could have used many others. And it should be remembered that the two are not separable. Everyone has a specific racialisation, and everyone is attributed a social class.

Not so fair distribution:

The usual mantra of difference is 'race, class and gender' (sometimes amended to 'and disability' or to 'and sexuality'). However class is sometimes downplayed in comparison to race and gender. It is even difficult to talk about it; surrogates for it like 'nice' or 'rough' school/neighbourhood/background are used. It is sometimes asserted that the issue is out of date since, it is claimed, 'we are all middle class now'. But as my colleagues Cristina Iannelli and Lindsay Paterson point out about class:

...in Scotland over the past half century...social class differences in educational attainment have not significantly reduced. (Iannelli & Paterson, 2005)

I have deliberately left out some of the quotation, while not distorting it. I shall come back to what was left out later in the lecture.

Not so fair distribution: race

Issues of race continue to plague education. The issues are complicated by the complex interactions between ethnicity, racism, ethnic heritage, migration, religion and colour. I choose to use the term 'race' because it points to racism. Racism positions people of particular ethnicities (etc.) in relation to the society in which they live. The following quotation refers to 'minority ethnic families' in Britain but, of course, is unlikely to be referring to, say, white South Africans in Britain.

Minority ethnic families are more likely to live in areas of deprivation...[There is] a complex interaction between socio-economic group, ethnicity and educational attainment. (Bhattacharyya, Ison & Blair, 2003: 21)

It might be noted that this quotation is not taken from old, last century, research. The issue is not going away as some commentators hoped it might when the children of the sixties migrations grew up and had families of their own. That may always have been a forlorn hope because it might also be noted that the quotation will refer to some black families in Sunderland and Liverpool whose families have lived there since at least before the first world war.

Social justice as ‘recognition’

A lot of attention has (rightly) been paid to social justice as an issue of unfair distribution of resources and opportunities. This issue should not, however, eclipse another one, which is the issue of what is, rather misleadingly, termed ‘recognition’. Charles Taylor coined the term and he explains it like this:

Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence... So a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being. (Taylor, 1992: 25)

In looking at examples where recognition is lacking I use a number of axes of difference: sexuality, gender, and social class. Again, none of these are separable. Everybody has a sexuality, gender and social class attribution.

(Lack of) recognition: sexuality and gender

The first example is of masculine sexuality. Thurwell’s observation is not news to anybody who spends time with young people.

Researchers have consistently found that terms such as ‘gay’ and ‘poof’ are often used to refer to anything deemed unmasculine, non-normative or ‘uncool’... The degradation of these terms as hate-words pollutes the social-psychological environment in which young people must live. (Thurwell, 2001: 26)

It should be noted that the young people in the quotation include straight young men as well as bisexual or gay ones.

(Lack of) recognition: multiple intersections

The next example, is taken from Wester Hailes in Edinburgh. It is not at all a middle class area. The author is anonymised. The quotation is taken from some writing he did while being one of our teacher education students here at Moray House (with his permission). In 2008 he wrote about growing up gay in Wester Hailes:

I have known that I was gay since I was eleven although I did not have a word for it then... I also hoped I was not gay because where I lived this was a term of abuse – shirtlifter, wuss, poof, bum chum, all those names were disgusting and did not describe me. By the time I got to fourth year I was paranoid about relationships and sex.

His experience would surely have been different (possibly as difficult, but differently so) if he had gone not to the local school in a poor area, but for instance, to Fettes.

(Lack of) recognition and education: gender

The last example of lack of recognition is about gender. It is interesting in that it distinguishes issues of redistribution and recognition. Focusing on gender and mathematics, it points out that it is not enough simply to enable women to have opportunities to study mathematics, and to take advantage of them. There is a further issue of their experience within that process and the effect this may have on them and on their approach to mathematics itself. It comes from some careful research on university students by Melissa Rodd and Hannah Bartholomew:

We note the dramatic advances in recent decades that have made studying advanced mathematics possible for many more women, but have seen the continuing privileging of masculine ways of being in relation to mathematics, resulting in defensive responses from the female students discussed here. (Rodd & Bartholomew, 2006: 47)

Social justice as action, joint action and belonging

In my book, *Getting Action for Social Justice in Education: Fairly Different*, I suggest some concepts and strategies for dealing with (not so fair) distribution and (lack of) recognition. Central to these is the concept of actually doing something, since we do not – and could not – live in a socially just utopia.

Without action there is no hope of getting more fairness into educational practices. In other words, social justice is a verb. (Griffiths, 2003: 113)

There are five mutually reinforcing essentials for improving social justice in education. These are: self-esteem, partnership, action, collective action and empowerment through voice. (Griffiths, Berry, Holt, Naylor & Weekes, 2006: 358)

As this list of essentials shows, part of my argument is that action needs to come about through participation rather than, for instance, through individuals acting alone, no matter how good their intentions. Unfortunately, it is as easy to find examples of lack of participation as it was to find examples of not-so-fair distribution and lack of recognition.

(Lack of) participation and education

Research by Wyness demonstrates some of the reasons for this. He researched into student councils in school and in the local authority. Student councils are a popular way of trying to improve participation, especially in the context of citizenship education. His comments are instructive.

The school councils and, to a lesser extent, the civic councils occupied an interstitial position within their respective institutional contexts. They were structurally ambiguous, neither providing clear political spaces for the expression of children's interests nor being clearly locked into the business of socialisation and education. (Wyness, 2005: 11)

This is also a matter of intersections of class, race, gender, disability, etc. One of the young men in the study commented:

One of the reasons why I stopped coming to meetings was because I was put off by the whole idea that this is really not so much a youth council as a social group for some middle class people and a chance to get opportunities.
(Wyness, 2005: 15)

This last quotation neatly demonstrates how the various elements which enhance social justice may intersect and interlink.

(3) What it is that is dismal about these findings

I have been outlining what I called the usual story of social justice and the dismal findings related to it. I now want to pose the question, what exactly is it that is dismal about them? What is it that is so good about education that lack of it is an injustice?

When I outlined not-so-fair distribution in relation to social class, I referred to some work by my colleagues, Cristina Iannelli and Lindsay Paterson. I remarked that I had deliberately left out some of the quotation, while not distorting it, and promised to come back to what had been left out.

Educational attainment has increased in Scotland over the past half century. **Nevertheless**, social class differences in educational attainment have not significantly reduced. (Iannelli & Paterson, 2005)

I have highlighted what was left out in the elision. It is a very interesting finding. In another discussion of educational attainment in relation to social class inequalities in England and in Scotland, they and some other colleagues pose the pertinent question:

Is the value of education intrinsic, such that everyone may benefit from its expansion, or is it a positional good whose value declines if others possess more of it? (Raffe, Croxford, Iannelli, Shapira & Howieson, 2006: 1)

The concept of a positional good is often illustrated with respect to consumer goods: a status symbol cannot be a status symbol if everyone possesses it. Positional goods notably include status, wealth and power. Educational achievement and experience is one route to all of these. Consider, for instance, the value of social networks found in private schooling, or consider the cachet of a degree from a high status university compared to a low status one.

I am grateful to my colleagues for raising this question. I have been intrigued by it ever since I came across it. Intellectual autobiography is difficult to be sure of, but it is very likely that the question inspired one of the main themes of this lecture.

The research by my colleagues looks specifically at attainment. This is evidently linked to issues related to positional goods. But this linkage is not peculiar to *direct* measures of attainment. Research links self-esteem to it too. Think of the quotations about sexuality. The specifically educational concern as opposed to the generally moral one, is about opportunity to flourish educationally and, by implication, to attain

high marks. Similarly for participation. Indeed in the example, the drop-out from the student council specifically mentions opportunities to get on. Similarly for a way of being in relation to learning. In the example, the mathematics related social capital of the young women doing mathematics will plainly differ from that of their male peers.

In short, we may note that much of the usual story of social justice (including my own) seems to be underpinned by a focus on positional goods. Its underpinning runs along the lines of: since education is a competition, let it be a fair one. But surely this cannot be the whole story? As a teacher and as a member of the educational community, I would be sorry to think that all I was doing was presiding over a fair competition for the glittering prizes our society has to offer. Indeed if that was the case, there are probably fairer ways to do it, since it seems that educational achievement is unlikely to be a good measure with which to select candidates for most professions and careers.

(4) What is missing from the usual story of social justice

There is a second point I want to raise in relation to that interesting question by David Raffé and the others: they ask whether ‘the value of education [is] intrinsic, such that everyone may benefit from its expansion’. There are two possible readings of ‘everyone’ here. Perhaps they refer to ‘every individual’. Perhaps they mean ‘our society’. Either way, education is conceived of as a ‘subservient practice’, a phrase I take from the Irish philosopher of education, Pádraig Hogan (Hogan, 2009). I think the Council of the European Union’s resolution on lifelong learning shows this particularly clearly. (And we may note that lifelong learning is increasingly conceptualised in terms of formal education and accreditation.) It begins as follows (CEU, 2002, para 1):

Education and training are an indispensable means of promoting social cohesion, active citizenship, personal and professional fulfilment, adaptability and employability. Lifelong learning facilitates free mobility for European citizens and allows the achievement of the goals and aspirations of European Union countries (i.e. to become more prosperous, competitive, tolerant and democratic). It should enable all persons to acquire the necessary knowledge to take part as active citizens in the knowledge society and the labour market.

In short, education is essentially for something else, be it social cohesion, personal fulfillment, employability or a more prosperous country.

Against this, I want to explore how far is education, formal education, also a good in itself. I want to explore what might be taken from attention to the delights that can be found even in learning something difficult and worthwhile; *especially in* learning something difficult and worthwhile. I am conscious how odd it may seem to start from delight. I wonder if this is precisely because education is so often assumed to be for something, and so is taken to be a worthy business, something that ought to be done.

Perhaps in talking of delight, I am just being romantic? Perhaps I am being not only romantic but also elitist? To deflect this kind of accusation I introduce the exploration

with some examples demonstrating that delight in education, formal education, is alive and well, and not confined to a few elite sectors of the population.

Examples of Education as a delight

In what follows I use real examples, some from my own practice as a teacher in university and in school.

Two new doctorates

I begin with a photograph of two of my doctoral students who were awarded their doctorates by Edinburgh University in 2008. They are Kelone Khudu-Petersen from Botswana and Pamela Stagg-Jones from the UK. They were photographed on the day in their doctoral scarlet, Pamela as she left the McEwan Hall after the ceremony and Kelone at a celebration afterwards in our garden.



Neither of these women are delighted only for instrumental reasons. Kelone began her period of study for positional, instrumental reasons. She was quite frank about this when she started. She told me she actually disliked research. However during her study she fell in love with the whole research process and became determined to carve out space for more as she returns to her post in the Faculty of Education at the University of Botswana.

Pamela had no positional or instrumental reasons for carrying out her research. She began in her sixties, once she had retired from teaching. She carried on with it in the face not only of the considerable financial cost, but also during house moves between the UK and the USA, hurricanes, a life-threatening pancreatic cancer illness and continuing trouble with her eye-sight. She told me that when people asked what she was going to do with her doctorate once she got it, she would say, ‘Do with it? Do with it? Flaunt it!’. Perhaps, it could be objected, if it was not instrumental, maybe it was a consumer good. Perhaps ‘being a doctor’ is something that could be considered icing on the cake of a good life. When I asked Pamela if it might be considered like that she replied very firmly: ‘No, it was not a luxury – it was a necessity.’

In rural Zimbabwe

My next example comes from rural Zimbabwe.



I want to take a passage from Doris Lessing's acceptance speech when she was awarded the Nobel prize for Literature in 2007.



She had recently visited her home country of Zimbabwe. Here is some of what she said:

But we in the West are not the only people in the world... I would like you to imagine yourselves somewhere in Southern Africa, standing in an Indian store, in a poor area, in a time of bad drought. There is a line of people, mostly women, with every kind of container for water. This store gets a bowser of precious water every afternoon from the town, and here the people wait.

The Indian is standing with the heels of his hands pressed down on the counter, and he is watching a black woman, who is bending over a wadge of paper that looks as if it has been torn from a book. She is reading Anna Karenina.

She is reading slowly, mouthing the words. It looks a difficult book. This is a young woman with two little children clutching at her legs. She is pregnant. The Indian is distressed, because the young woman's headscarf, which should be white, is yellow with dust. This man is distressed because of the lines of people, all thirsty. He doesn't have enough water for them. This man is curious. He says to the young woman, "What are you reading?"

"It is about Russia," says the girl.

"Do you know where Russia is?" He hardly knows himself.

The young woman looks straight at him, full of dignity, though her eyes are red from dust, "I was best in the class. My teacher said I was best."

The young woman resumes her reading. She wants to get to the end of the paragraph. The Indian knows he shouldn't do this but he reaches down to a great plastic container beside him, behind the counter, and pours out two mugs of water, which he hands to the children. He watches while the girl looks at her children drinking, her mouth moving. He gives her a mug of water. It hurts him to see her drinking it, so painfully thirsty is she.

Now she hands him her own plastic water container, which he fills. The young woman and the children watch him closely so that he doesn't spill any. She is bending again over the book. She reads slowly. The paragraph fascinates her and she reads it again.

"Varenka, with her white kerchief over her black hair, surrounded by the children and gaily and good-humouredly busy with them, and at the same visibly excited at the possibility of an offer of marriage from a man she cared for, looked very attractive. Koznyshev walked by her side and kept casting admiring glances at her. Looking at her, he recalled all the delightful things he had heard from her lips, all the good he knew about her, and became more and more conscious that the feeling he had for her was something rare, something he had felt but once before, long, long ago, in his early youth."

This lump of print is lying on the counter, together with some old copies of magazines, some pages of newspapers with girls in bikinis. It is time for the woman to leave the haven of the Indian store, to leave the print, and set off back along the four miles to her village.

This is literary art. Lessing was, after all, receiving a Nobel prize for literature. We must doubt if it is factually true. She does not claim that it is. But she places it within the frame of literacy in Zimbabwe and the desperate hunger for scarce books in that country. So, in my view, we are entitled to believe in its truth, if not its literal truth. Part of that truth is the delight and joy taken in reading, regardless of its use value in our lives, whether in employment or in the community.

(5) Joy in relation to justice

What has all this to do with social justice and joy? One reason that I use the word 'joy' is that I have long been struck by Robin Richardson's way of explaining why we might care about justice. He says:

Not that justice is an end in itself. Its purpose is to make the world safer for hope, love and rejoicing. Justice and joy: each is the ground and the fruit of the other. (Richardson, 1996:20)

This is not a particularly new thought, though I think that Richardson puts it particularly well. In the *Politics*, one of the most influential books on social justice in Western thought, Aristotle said:

The good life is the chief end both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually. (*Politics III, 6, 1278b6*)

The good in the sphere of politics is justice. (*Politics III, 11, 1282b14*)

I am not sure how much Aristotle regarded joy as essential to the good life; there are conflicting views about how to translate the Greek: he uses the word *eudaimonia* which is variously translated as 'joy', 'flourishing', and, with some reservations, 'happiness'. In my view it is hard to imagine a good life without joy. It should, of course, be distinguished from mere pleasure or fun. It is more similar to delight. In any case it is clear that both Richardson and Aristotle are referring to something that is significant in the kind of life that it is worth trying to accomplish, both for ourselves and for the society of which we are a part.

From Aristotle's *Politics*, I turn to another much more recent political philosopher, Hannah Arendt. In a famous passage in *The Human Condition*, she says:

How do we know what is good, where to find hope, love, rejoicing, joy?
What I propose is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing. (Arendt, 1958:5)

Arendt was, as is well known, a student of Heidegger's. So it is likely that, like him, she did not identify thinking with problem-solving. I read Arendt's proposal as a plea for that other kind of hard thinking: attentiveness. While I was preparing this address I came across a thoughtful paper by my colleague, Abbie Garrington, discussing attentiveness in relation to nature poetry. It reinforced my view that we should focus more on this kind of thinking in education.

(6) My own pedagogical delights as a teacher

In what follows, I attend, thoughtfully, to joy *in* education in order to tease out some features of joy in education. This being potentially a very large topic (even if joy and education are rarely discursively connected these days), I focus on one small element. I focus on some of my own delights as a teacher.

I should perhaps mention here that the word 'delight' is taken from the title of J.B. Priestly's lovely but little known book, *Delights*. It is a collection of short pieces, some of them no more than half a page, none of them more than three. They celebrate large and small delights in his everyday life, including, for instance, family jokes, the pleasure and gratitude of children, blossom and smoking in a hot bath. I think that taken together these short pieces point to a way of understanding and living a life which is worth living.

So in the rest of the lecture I pay think about and pay attention to what delights *me* – *this* teacher - in formal education, as a way of *beginning* to get clear about the point of teaching and formal education at all. To repeat, this is a beginning, the first word not the last. I do not think that I am representative of everyone. And I think the delights of students, administrators and policy makers would be just as relevant. I have grouped my delights by theme.

Pedagogical relationship.



I return to Pamela. She is plainly delighted, as I said before. However, my point here is that I, too, was delighted. Indeed, I still am. I had been her supervisor over the long period of supervision necessary for a part-time doctoral student, watching and helping

as she met various intellectual challenges. I am describing a supervisory relationship which was happy, indeed intense, in which I delighted in her success.

Such delight is not confined to PhD teaching in a university. Here is another photograph. This time it is of some of my undergraduates twenty years ago. The



courses in that university were modular and I met these students, for just ten sessions over the course of one module. In fact I did not meet these particular students again. I do not remember them all, and I have an awful memory for names. However I do remember Jenny because of an educational delight associated with her. She had a hard time coming to terms with the way we taught the concept of educational control. Put simply, it involved us handing over a lot of control, including of assessment, to the students. They had to organize themselves and their learning and then give their group a group mark. If they assessed themselves high enough that would be enough to give them a bare pass. We did not moderate those results. She did not get the point. Perhaps this was partly because she was a mature, hardworking, committed student, whose previous employment was in a very controlled and hierarchical profession, where hard work and commitment counted for a lot. I remember the struggle and I remember something of our discussions about how she could come to terms with it. We developed a relationship based on this pedagogical issue and I was personally delighted when she found some resolution and obtained a grade she was happy enough with.



This delight is also to be found when teaching children. Here is a classroom in a very small town in Maine, USA. I helped to teach these six year olds for two months in 1988, teaching alongside the classroom teacher, Robin. We traveled to school together each morning, half an hour by car in the snow. On the way we talked intensely, as teachers do, about the children. I realized just how intense this relationship with them must have been when she wrote to me ten years later with a person by person up-date of the children in the class. Far from being bored, I devoured it.

I have been describing a pedagogical relationship. It is a quite specific human relationship. It can be distinguished from other relationships with family, customers,

clients and friends. My pupils and students are not family, customers, clients or friends, though they may those as well. Like family relationships and friendships, pedagogical relationships bring delight (and heartache too). But such similarities can be overemphasised. In a time when teaching, like many other professional relationships, is so often conceptualised in economic terminology of client or customer, it is especially important to emphasise the specificity of pedagogy.

Learning

The next theme is learning. To return to those children in Maine. I want to focus on one. I called her Kira in an article I wrote in 1990 when I was back from the USA. It describes delight in learning.

Kira is six. She skips across the classroom, looking as if she is floating above the floor. I am floating myself. She has just managed to count out a pile of beans equal in number to the calendar date; divide it into two piles; count each half and write down the result in an addition sum. She has got all this right for the first time this morning, after a month's effort by both of us. I had forgotten how the delight in teaching comes from these small – I should say, huge! – triumphs. Kira's progress in numbers; Jarod's new-found thrill in writing stories; Cassie's discovery of the world of natural science.



I find delight in the learning of my doctoral students too. The picture shows Flossie who was my doctoral student in Nottingham. We were talking recently about our memories of that supervision. We both remembered an evening five years ago. She had been struggling to provide an original critique of the hero of her doctorate, Paulo Freire. That evening she produced the beginnings of one. I cycled home singing, elated. She tells me she drove home in the same state.

What I am emphasizing here is that a pedagogical relationship is about *learning*. My examples were about learning number, and learning to take a critical attitude. In both cases it was learning achieved with difficulty as a result of teaching. I had helped to bring about that learning by teaching something that I judge to be worthwhile.

Becoming

My third theme is becoming. Here I return to Flossie. She contributed to an article I wrote with Jean Barr in David Aspin's collection, *Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning*. She contributed a piece about her own lifelong learning. It describes her becoming what she had not been when she began her studies.

I came to England to learn more about Freire. I have come from far and this is a process of lifelong education, continuing education. When I was at university I'd gone through a lot of experiences which had empowered me to take this understanding that I have now to Shiefton, (a Black Saturday school

in Nottingham). I decided to design a proposal to work with Shiefton to see if we could work better. The proposal was Freirean. To work out a Freirean method is not an easy thing. It is not something you can memorise or go and tell people. It is something you work through together. In the process both of you become changed. All of that is a process. It is not something that you have predetermined. You have been engaged in the search, and when we say search, it means a true search: not something that you have hidden and know where it is. You don't know what the possibilities are, and then you engage and it becomes a very active search. It becomes a movement. You all get moved into it. You have all the excitement of doing it. And in the end you say, 'Wow!' (Griffiths and Barr, 2007: 203-4)

It may be important to point out that this is not about confidence. She had plenty of that in Malawi. It is about who she has become as a result of her education.

Similarly, Pamela said, 'I feel quite new now it's finished.' This is no mere feeling. Since obtaining the doctorate she has persuaded a local authority in Florida to take seriously a course (drawing on her doctorate) she described as being about metaphysics, metaphor and metamorphosis. This is something she could not have done before. Nor is it something that either she or I could have predicted. As Flossie says, becoming is something that is undetermined. Such becoming is not confined to doctoral students. Some of the classroom assistants I taught as part of a Childhood Studies pre-undergraduate course also reported that they had changed. They said they had begun to speak up in staff meetings. Yes, they were expressing themselves with confidence, but they had also become what they had not been. We are all, if we are learning, what we are not yet.

Learning is sometimes described using the metaphor of a seed becoming a plant. But education is not like that. Human learning is not so predictable. Nor is it (*pace* John Locke) like moulding some material to a desirable shape. There is a freedom in the learning resulting from pedagogical relationships which leads to an openness of becoming. My students become what they were not then, and what I did not predict. It is a delight to watch and to be part of.

Entrancement

My final set of delights are all about *entrancement*. To use Pádraig Hogan's memorable phrase, they are about learning to inhabit new imaginative neighbourhoods. My examples again draw both from teaching children and from teaching adults.

In my first year of teaching I took my Year 5 class of nine and ten year olds to a Falconry Centre where we saw a number of different hawks and falcons and watched a demonstration of falconry. Jeff came too. He was from Year 4, but had missed his class outing. The following year he was in my class. One of the regular activities in the class was the creation of a 'topic book'. The children had to choose a subject of interest to them, find out about it using the library and then write it up in their book. Every page of Jeff's topic book was of birds. When I remarked on this to his parents they explained that he had been very taken with the Falconry Centre. He was now keen on everything to do with birds, and had even persuaded his parents to join the RSPB. He had entered a whole new imaginative neighbourhood.

Kira too had entered a new imaginative neighbourhood of numbers. So had Jenny. In her case it was the neighbourhood of concepts of control and discipline. So had Kelone and Flossie, who I have described entering neighbourhoods of research and critique, respectively.

Educational delights

These examples are just a beginning. They are only stories told from the perspective of a teacher and they are all told by just one teacher. At least they are about a range of learners as well as a range of delights. They are also, I hope, stories of delights that those in the audience who are teachers may share. They are, I hope, a beginning of a shared enterprise of attending to educational delights: to sources of joy in education. The beginning as I have presented it here suggests the following delights as significant:

- Pedagogical relationship
- Learning
- Becoming
- Entrancement; new ‘imaginative neighbourhoods’

There is much more to be said about each of these, but for now I want to return to the main theme of this address, the question of joy and justice in education.

(8) Loss of all that is itself an injustice

Earlier, I pointed out that the usual account of social justice in education focused on education as a subservient practice. Some of the things that it is subservient to are themselves valuable and significant; such subservience is in order. However, that is not all that education is. It is valuable in itself, and indeed some of the other worthwhile ways of being and doing should, in turn, be subservient to it. For instance, yes, education in some senses is necessary to getting a flourishing economy on one hand, and an active citizenry on the other. At the same time both models of the economy and models of citizenship have to include a subservience to education as part of what makes a flourishing economy or an active citizenry worthwhile.

It is now possible to suggest why the usual story of social justice needs to be enlarged. Missing out on the delights of education is an injustice. I hope I have left you with a sense of the injustice that is done in denying these delights to students. It remains true that it is crucially important to work for social justice in terms of distribution, recognition, action, joint action and belonging, and that it is important for a range of instrumental reasons. My argument here is that distribution, recognition and the rest are important for educational reasons too, because of the significance that a good education has in itself, and regardless of instrumental considerations.

(9) Some questions about the implications for our own practice as teacher educators.

At the end of this address, I do not want to conclude so much as to leave you with some questions about teacher education, and its benchmarks. Do we in Scotland teach our students about the heart of the matter? Do we teach joy and justice in our teacher

education courses? Issues related to the pedagogical relationship, learning, becoming and entrancement: are they there? Is there space for opening up new imaginative neighbourhoods? My own answer is that these can be found in the benchmarks, but in order to do so, they need to be ‘read slant’. For instance, we can find the phrase ‘encourage challenge and enjoyment...’. However, it has to be said that the terminology of the benchmarks and if policy generally is not that way inclined. *But* we could still do it. Do we?

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